By Moa Jamir
Nagaland’s employment challenge is no longer defined by unemployment alone. The detailed analysis of the Survey Report on Employment, Unemployment, Skill and Migration in Nagaland 2025 by the Directorate of Economics & Statistics, Nagaland (DES) reveals a deeper and arguably more troubling reality: work, even when available, is largely insecure, informal and poorly protected.
At first glance, the DES survey presents figures that may appear reassuring. An employment rate of 83.92 per cent and a Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) of 56 per cent suggest that a significant proportion of Nagaland’s working-age population is engaged in economic activity. However, these headline indicators mask the quality of employment beneath them. Nearly half of the workforce is without any form of social security, and about two in three workers operate without written job contracts. Employment, in effect, exists without protection.
The social security gap is stark. Only a small fraction of workers enjoy comprehensive benefits covering pensions, gratuity and healthcare. A sizeable 46 per cent are explicitly excluded from all listed forms of social protection, while another 15 per cent are unsure whether they are covered at all. This uncertainty is as telling as it is curious, particularly in the presence of schemes such as the Chief Minister’s Health Insurance Scheme, raising questions about awareness, enrolment and communication gaps.
Contractual insecurity reinforces this vulnerability. With 65 per cent of workers lacking written contracts and more than half ineligible for paid leave, Nagaland’s labour market is dominated by informal arrangements that offer little recourse in times of crisis. Long-term contracts remain the exception rather than the norm. Even where employment is sustained, stability is not guaranteed.
District-level data further complicates the picture. High labour force participation in districts like Mokokchung or Wokha does not necessarily translate into secure employment. In fact, high participation often reflects economic compulsion rather than opportunity, with a substantial share of workers engaged in casual or self-employed activity. Conversely, more urbanised districts such as Dimapur and Mokokchung show higher unemployment and greater reliance on casual labour, challenging assumptions that urbanisation or relative development automatically produce better employment outcomes.
This is where the DES findings intersect meaningfully with trends highlighted by the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) for 2023-24 released earlier in September 2024. It indicated sharp reversal in Nagaland’s unemployment trajectory, particularly among youth and educated persons. Youth unemployment has climbed to over 27 per cent, with urban youth facing rates nearing 40 per cent. Educated unemployment, after years of decline, has also surged to 13.4%, placing Nagaland among the worst-performing states.
The question, then, is whether the DES survey represents a continuation of this. In that sense, both data sources may be pointing to the same underlying concern from different angles: jobs are either unavailable for many young and educated Nagas, or available only in forms that offer little security or long-term prospects.
Further, the DES findings point to a structural weakness underpinning these trends: 92 per cent of residents lack any form of technical or vocational education, with no respondents reporting formal training in crafts or structured on-the-job vocational training.
For policymakers, the implication is clear. Addressing Nagaland’s employment crisis cannot be reduced to job creation in numerical terms alone. It demands attention to job quality stronger employment conditions, wider social security coverage, formalised contracts, and better awareness and access to existing welfare mechanisms. The more fundamental question, however, is whether the Government is willing to read, acknowledge, and act on its own report.
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