Earlier, the ‘Naga Issue’ generally meant only a single dimension – the ‘Indo-Naga issue’. But now the “Naga Issue” may be said to be comprising of at least two dimensions - the external (Indo-Myanmar-Naga) and the internal (among Nagas). Simplistically, the current cease-fire and peace process with the Government of India may say to represent the external, and the reconciliation process led by the Forum of Naga Reconciliation (FNR), the internal. However, these two processes cannot be compartmentalized and put in parallel tracks. Rather, they are irrevocably intertwined. They interplay and intersect each other constantly. To understand one, one has to understand and take into account the other. Consequently, it is most likely that failure or success in either shall have a direct and proportional impact upon the other. Now, if we accept this premise, even if only partially, where do we stand today, and where do we go now?
It is a matter of public record that one party of the cease-fire with the govt of India (GOI) has recently stated that the peace process with the GOI has reached a stalemate. The publicly stated position of the other party with cease-fire with GOI is that they shall not yet enter into peace talks at the political level. This is the current status of the external part. The status of the internal part f the Naga issue, reconciliation, has also reached a stalemate as publicly stated by the FNR; though it has recently given a call not to lose heart. Shall this be our final destination beyond which we cannot go any further or do we still have some more miles to go? Or shall it be the more miles to return? “Going” may mean towards a better future or even worse. We do not know. But at least we aspire and hope for a better future. But a “return” to a break down of ceasefire and internecine war, shall surely mean anarchy and chaos with more tears and bloodshed.
Thus being at a stalemate position in both situations, how do we do a reality check or a re-orientation to try and gain a breakthrough? Maybe, we need to do a re-look and a re-thinking, starting with the though process and motives of the people involved. A honest self-evaluation. Sun Tzü, the Chinese General in his “The Art of War”, written some 2,500 years ago, and now widely used in leading universities across the world may give a direction. “The Art of War” is not necessarily only about making war literally, but also about avoiding a war, conflict management and resolution - “therefore, to gain a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence. To subjugate the enemy’s army without battle is the highest of excellence” (Sun Tzü). This simply is not about benevolence or compassion, but often the heavy cost by engaging in battle was a bitter price to pay. So what better way to avoid the costs of fighting than by wining without fighting?
Sun Tzü said, “if he (the enemy) seeks peace without a treaty, he is calculating”. The ‘calculating’ is on five distinct factors – Way, Heaven, Ground, General, and Law.
“The ‘Way’ represents unity in a moral purpose. From top to bottom, people of all ranks strive for the same goals as they are one person. The reason they unite lies in the morality of the goal: greater the moral cause, the tighter the union. If your Way is strong, you will naturally garner strong support from others. In such a condition, the only fear of betrayal is not the people betraying the leaders, but rather the leaders betraying the people by not acting in the people’s best interest” (Annotation & Translation by Thomas Huynh).
In the Naga situation, the moral cause was right and was strong. The people were rallied and united around a cause that was just. The Way was strong. But now, does it enjoy the same strength and status? In the peace process, is there a calculation by the Govt of India (GOI) to see how far this can be weakened? Is there a calculation to see how far, disunity can be brought within and among the Nagas? How far, we ourselves, are contributing to such a game? Nagas are using the moral case with India, but for reconciliation among us, each political group is trying to claim their stand as the only moral stand. But the fact is, such claims and counter claims may not hold much water for long, as there are leakages in all the three containers. Maybe, only the extent and severity of the leakages may vary. Once a moral case is damaged, it is difficult to repair. Will not any adversary calculate and attempt to weaken or damage the moral fibre of his opponent by any means?
The second of the five factors is ‘Heaven’, which represents the atmosphere – the time of day, weather, and season. A soldier’s or an Army’s abilities may be affected by the weather. For instance, in Russia, the defeat of the German army was also largely attributed to the cold biting winter for which they were ill prepared. The Russian winter is also called the ‘winter General’ which contributed in defeating Napoleon.
Heaven can likewise represent the social atmosphere – the moods and attitudes of the people. These can change over time, yet repeat with regularity. Though we cannot fully predict the weather nor the mood changes of the people with certainty, yet we can anticipate these changes and benefit from them once they occur. What is the social or the economic atmosphere of the Naga people today, compared with that when our National movement started decades ago? What is also the mood or the attitude of the Naga people today? Is it more conducive for continued armed resistance or less conducive? Is it more ideological driven or less? The answers unfortunately, may be less positive than one might desire. These are some of the changes in ‘environment’ that the adversary might be calculating, to try and derive some advantage, but without conceding any.
The third factor is ‘Ground’, which represents the landscape, with its restrictions and freedoms.
“Ground represents many of the concrete factors that make up your environment, such as society’s established laws or unwritten rules of acceptable social behavior. So although you cannot directly control the law or culture, and it often determines how you should approach your conflict, you do have the ability to choose when and where to take action based on your particular situation. For instance, you can formulate a strategy that is protected by the law or social norms; your enemy would be hard pressed to oppose the legal system or draw society’s disapproval of your actions. Taken together, Heaven and Ground represent your overall environment. You can’t substantially change or influence it, but if you are flexible and respond to each factor accordingly, you will create options that are advantageous for you” (Annotation & Translation by Thomas Huynh).
Nagas had a strong Ground – a well defined set of unwritten rules of social behavior, customs and laws. This formed a strong basis forming the bulwark of resistance against any alien forces, from the British since 1829, to the Indian army intrusions beginning from 1954. After two decades of armed resistance and much bloodshed, Naga customary practices and laws were formally recognized and given protection, though the original goals are yet to be achieved. During the earlier resistance, Naga areas were thickly forested and inaccessible. This provided a natural Ground for jungle-based guerrilla tactics. Now the jungles are gone, and there are many new roads, reducing the levels of inaccessibility to a great extent. The Indian army too is acquiring expertise in jungle warfare, where the Vairengte School in Mizoram too plays an active role is propagating the lessons learnt. The earlier strong ethics of customary practices and laws of the Naga tribes which wer e binding, too are now beginning to show the strains of urbanization and modernity. Are the Nagas losing the earlier advantage of a strong Ground? Is the calculation showing the odds increasing against the Nagas on the Ground factor?
The fourth factor is ‘General’, which represents five beneficial qualities of an effective leader. These five attributes are – wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage and discipline. To rally the people around the leader, the leadership must have these attributes. Today, does the Naga leadership, whether ‘underground’ or ‘overground’ exhibit wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage and discipline? If such attributes cannot be found in the leadership, the enemy shall quickly learn about it and try to present an alternative to shift the loyalty of the people. In such a situation, instead of fighting a war, the enemy shall lure the army or the people away and can win without fighting.
The fifth of the five factors is ‘Law’, which represents the management of strength. A system to manage everyone’s efforts and the proper and efficient allocation of resources. This involves standard procedures, division of labour, procurement and distribution of materials, and cost reduction. Law is organization, the chain of command, logistics, and the control of expenses. How far are we Nagas good at this? When we can’t even keep a reserved forest protected, highways free from encroachments, uncontrollable number of check gates and taxations, the answers may not fetch a pass mark. In contrast, the extraordinary disciplined response of the Japanese people in the wake of the recent series of calamities, is a lesson in Law.
War, although often chaotic, does require a particular ‘method of madness’. Its not complete anarchy. Sure, some battles may turn into disorganized firefights. But, on the whole, wars are fought (and won) by those armies with command of war strategy and battlefield tactics. It is thus clear – wars cannot be won by armies (read – people), when their Law (organization) is weak. Similarly, the economy of the people or a state cannot develop to its full potential when their Law is weak.
“There are no more than five musical notes, yet the variations in the five notes cannot all be heard. There are no more than five basic colors, yet the variations in the five colors cannot all be seen. There are no more than five basic flavors, yet the variations in the five flavors cannot all be tasted.
In battle, there are no more than two types of attacks: Uncommon and common, yet the variations of the common and the uncommon cannot all be comprehended” (Sun Tzü).
Just as the finite number of five notes, colors and flavours can become infinite once they combine, so too common and uncommon maneuvers when combined. If the common and the uncommon maneuvers can form a seamless circle, the opposition does not know when a common maneuver starts and when an uncommon maneuver ends.
At the time of Indian independence, India most probably expected the ‘insignificant small group of Nagas’ to quickly join the Indian Union like the hundreds of other Indian princely states. However, the Naga response was uncommon and the Indian govt was totally unprepared. They instinctively did what they had seen and learnt from the British during its two centuries old acquaintances – use brute force. The Army was sent in to crush the movement, expecting a quick victory. Again when it did not happen, extra-constitutional powers were given to the army in form of the draconian AFSPA, again a carbon copy of the British Act before independence. Again when it still did not work, they again changed tactics, but still a common maneuver – divide and rule. It did a lot of damage to the Nagas, but still their uncommon response were not completely neutralized. Finally, the time tested method of parleys were employed in the form of cease-fire. The first cease-fire (1964) for all practical purpose, appears to be de-facto abrogated by the GOI, as heavy fighting soon ensued. But the second and the third cease-fires are somehow still holding. In course of the present cease-fire, the Nagas initiated a maneuver, which was again most probably not expected by the Indian govt. – the reconciliation process and the Covenant of Reconciliation (CoR). This may have upset or threatened some of the calculations, and hence, the repeated common maneuver response of divide and rule method, manifested through media war, propaganda, military-civic actions, low level but consistent provocations against the spirit of the cease-fire, bifurcation of Naga geographical areas into different administrative areas etc. Will Nagas fall prey to the common machinations of the adversary or respond with a most extraordinary maneuver by succeeding in our reconciliation process? This shall have a high probability of snatching victory for the Naga political history, and people’s sovereignty. A prolonged cease-fire without a resolution means only a prolonged period of ‘no fighting’ or a ‘no battle’ situation. What does this imply? It is generally accepted that in an unequal fight between a large conventional army and a small guerrilla force, not wining for the conventional army is losing, and not losing for the guerilla force is actually wining. A cease-fire used to gain just some strategic space by a party simply for calculating, is creating a win-loss equation, and nothing much positive can be expected out of it. Rather, we can expect much, only if a cease-fire or a reconciliation process is used to genuinely create a respectful win-win equation.
This brings us back to the start of the ‘game’ – “if he seeks peace without a treaty, he is calculating”. In the ‘Naga issue’, is one party serious and sincere whereas the other may be just calculating only? The calculation is done not simply by studying the opponent from a distance, but often times, by INSERT IGNOREing moles and spies in the enemy’s camp to gather intelligence and information, and often times spread disinformation.
The one maneuver that India can easily employ, is time. He can afford another two decades or more of continuous cease-fire. But can the Nagas afford it? Therefore, instead of just calculating to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the adversary for possible gains or wins, is the GOI really seeking peace with the Nagas through the peace process? Will a solution really materialize within the term of this UPA-II as the Prime Minister had stated or even within this year as the Interlocutor has said? Are the Nagas also really seeking peace among themselves through reconciliation as solemnly stated in the Covenant of Reconciliation? Only a Treaty on the table may convince the people.
It is a matter of public record that one party of the cease-fire with the govt of India (GOI) has recently stated that the peace process with the GOI has reached a stalemate. The publicly stated position of the other party with cease-fire with GOI is that they shall not yet enter into peace talks at the political level. This is the current status of the external part. The status of the internal part f the Naga issue, reconciliation, has also reached a stalemate as publicly stated by the FNR; though it has recently given a call not to lose heart. Shall this be our final destination beyond which we cannot go any further or do we still have some more miles to go? Or shall it be the more miles to return? “Going” may mean towards a better future or even worse. We do not know. But at least we aspire and hope for a better future. But a “return” to a break down of ceasefire and internecine war, shall surely mean anarchy and chaos with more tears and bloodshed.
Thus being at a stalemate position in both situations, how do we do a reality check or a re-orientation to try and gain a breakthrough? Maybe, we need to do a re-look and a re-thinking, starting with the though process and motives of the people involved. A honest self-evaluation. Sun Tzü, the Chinese General in his “The Art of War”, written some 2,500 years ago, and now widely used in leading universities across the world may give a direction. “The Art of War” is not necessarily only about making war literally, but also about avoiding a war, conflict management and resolution - “therefore, to gain a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence. To subjugate the enemy’s army without battle is the highest of excellence” (Sun Tzü). This simply is not about benevolence or compassion, but often the heavy cost by engaging in battle was a bitter price to pay. So what better way to avoid the costs of fighting than by wining without fighting?
Sun Tzü said, “if he (the enemy) seeks peace without a treaty, he is calculating”. The ‘calculating’ is on five distinct factors – Way, Heaven, Ground, General, and Law.
“The ‘Way’ represents unity in a moral purpose. From top to bottom, people of all ranks strive for the same goals as they are one person. The reason they unite lies in the morality of the goal: greater the moral cause, the tighter the union. If your Way is strong, you will naturally garner strong support from others. In such a condition, the only fear of betrayal is not the people betraying the leaders, but rather the leaders betraying the people by not acting in the people’s best interest” (Annotation & Translation by Thomas Huynh).
In the Naga situation, the moral cause was right and was strong. The people were rallied and united around a cause that was just. The Way was strong. But now, does it enjoy the same strength and status? In the peace process, is there a calculation by the Govt of India (GOI) to see how far this can be weakened? Is there a calculation to see how far, disunity can be brought within and among the Nagas? How far, we ourselves, are contributing to such a game? Nagas are using the moral case with India, but for reconciliation among us, each political group is trying to claim their stand as the only moral stand. But the fact is, such claims and counter claims may not hold much water for long, as there are leakages in all the three containers. Maybe, only the extent and severity of the leakages may vary. Once a moral case is damaged, it is difficult to repair. Will not any adversary calculate and attempt to weaken or damage the moral fibre of his opponent by any means?
The second of the five factors is ‘Heaven’, which represents the atmosphere – the time of day, weather, and season. A soldier’s or an Army’s abilities may be affected by the weather. For instance, in Russia, the defeat of the German army was also largely attributed to the cold biting winter for which they were ill prepared. The Russian winter is also called the ‘winter General’ which contributed in defeating Napoleon.
Heaven can likewise represent the social atmosphere – the moods and attitudes of the people. These can change over time, yet repeat with regularity. Though we cannot fully predict the weather nor the mood changes of the people with certainty, yet we can anticipate these changes and benefit from them once they occur. What is the social or the economic atmosphere of the Naga people today, compared with that when our National movement started decades ago? What is also the mood or the attitude of the Naga people today? Is it more conducive for continued armed resistance or less conducive? Is it more ideological driven or less? The answers unfortunately, may be less positive than one might desire. These are some of the changes in ‘environment’ that the adversary might be calculating, to try and derive some advantage, but without conceding any.
The third factor is ‘Ground’, which represents the landscape, with its restrictions and freedoms.
“Ground represents many of the concrete factors that make up your environment, such as society’s established laws or unwritten rules of acceptable social behavior. So although you cannot directly control the law or culture, and it often determines how you should approach your conflict, you do have the ability to choose when and where to take action based on your particular situation. For instance, you can formulate a strategy that is protected by the law or social norms; your enemy would be hard pressed to oppose the legal system or draw society’s disapproval of your actions. Taken together, Heaven and Ground represent your overall environment. You can’t substantially change or influence it, but if you are flexible and respond to each factor accordingly, you will create options that are advantageous for you” (Annotation & Translation by Thomas Huynh).
Nagas had a strong Ground – a well defined set of unwritten rules of social behavior, customs and laws. This formed a strong basis forming the bulwark of resistance against any alien forces, from the British since 1829, to the Indian army intrusions beginning from 1954. After two decades of armed resistance and much bloodshed, Naga customary practices and laws were formally recognized and given protection, though the original goals are yet to be achieved. During the earlier resistance, Naga areas were thickly forested and inaccessible. This provided a natural Ground for jungle-based guerrilla tactics. Now the jungles are gone, and there are many new roads, reducing the levels of inaccessibility to a great extent. The Indian army too is acquiring expertise in jungle warfare, where the Vairengte School in Mizoram too plays an active role is propagating the lessons learnt. The earlier strong ethics of customary practices and laws of the Naga tribes which wer e binding, too are now beginning to show the strains of urbanization and modernity. Are the Nagas losing the earlier advantage of a strong Ground? Is the calculation showing the odds increasing against the Nagas on the Ground factor?
The fourth factor is ‘General’, which represents five beneficial qualities of an effective leader. These five attributes are – wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage and discipline. To rally the people around the leader, the leadership must have these attributes. Today, does the Naga leadership, whether ‘underground’ or ‘overground’ exhibit wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage and discipline? If such attributes cannot be found in the leadership, the enemy shall quickly learn about it and try to present an alternative to shift the loyalty of the people. In such a situation, instead of fighting a war, the enemy shall lure the army or the people away and can win without fighting.
The fifth of the five factors is ‘Law’, which represents the management of strength. A system to manage everyone’s efforts and the proper and efficient allocation of resources. This involves standard procedures, division of labour, procurement and distribution of materials, and cost reduction. Law is organization, the chain of command, logistics, and the control of expenses. How far are we Nagas good at this? When we can’t even keep a reserved forest protected, highways free from encroachments, uncontrollable number of check gates and taxations, the answers may not fetch a pass mark. In contrast, the extraordinary disciplined response of the Japanese people in the wake of the recent series of calamities, is a lesson in Law.
War, although often chaotic, does require a particular ‘method of madness’. Its not complete anarchy. Sure, some battles may turn into disorganized firefights. But, on the whole, wars are fought (and won) by those armies with command of war strategy and battlefield tactics. It is thus clear – wars cannot be won by armies (read – people), when their Law (organization) is weak. Similarly, the economy of the people or a state cannot develop to its full potential when their Law is weak.
“There are no more than five musical notes, yet the variations in the five notes cannot all be heard. There are no more than five basic colors, yet the variations in the five colors cannot all be seen. There are no more than five basic flavors, yet the variations in the five flavors cannot all be tasted.
In battle, there are no more than two types of attacks: Uncommon and common, yet the variations of the common and the uncommon cannot all be comprehended” (Sun Tzü).
Just as the finite number of five notes, colors and flavours can become infinite once they combine, so too common and uncommon maneuvers when combined. If the common and the uncommon maneuvers can form a seamless circle, the opposition does not know when a common maneuver starts and when an uncommon maneuver ends.
At the time of Indian independence, India most probably expected the ‘insignificant small group of Nagas’ to quickly join the Indian Union like the hundreds of other Indian princely states. However, the Naga response was uncommon and the Indian govt was totally unprepared. They instinctively did what they had seen and learnt from the British during its two centuries old acquaintances – use brute force. The Army was sent in to crush the movement, expecting a quick victory. Again when it did not happen, extra-constitutional powers were given to the army in form of the draconian AFSPA, again a carbon copy of the British Act before independence. Again when it still did not work, they again changed tactics, but still a common maneuver – divide and rule. It did a lot of damage to the Nagas, but still their uncommon response were not completely neutralized. Finally, the time tested method of parleys were employed in the form of cease-fire. The first cease-fire (1964) for all practical purpose, appears to be de-facto abrogated by the GOI, as heavy fighting soon ensued. But the second and the third cease-fires are somehow still holding. In course of the present cease-fire, the Nagas initiated a maneuver, which was again most probably not expected by the Indian govt. – the reconciliation process and the Covenant of Reconciliation (CoR). This may have upset or threatened some of the calculations, and hence, the repeated common maneuver response of divide and rule method, manifested through media war, propaganda, military-civic actions, low level but consistent provocations against the spirit of the cease-fire, bifurcation of Naga geographical areas into different administrative areas etc. Will Nagas fall prey to the common machinations of the adversary or respond with a most extraordinary maneuver by succeeding in our reconciliation process? This shall have a high probability of snatching victory for the Naga political history, and people’s sovereignty. A prolonged cease-fire without a resolution means only a prolonged period of ‘no fighting’ or a ‘no battle’ situation. What does this imply? It is generally accepted that in an unequal fight between a large conventional army and a small guerrilla force, not wining for the conventional army is losing, and not losing for the guerilla force is actually wining. A cease-fire used to gain just some strategic space by a party simply for calculating, is creating a win-loss equation, and nothing much positive can be expected out of it. Rather, we can expect much, only if a cease-fire or a reconciliation process is used to genuinely create a respectful win-win equation.
This brings us back to the start of the ‘game’ – “if he seeks peace without a treaty, he is calculating”. In the ‘Naga issue’, is one party serious and sincere whereas the other may be just calculating only? The calculation is done not simply by studying the opponent from a distance, but often times, by INSERT IGNOREing moles and spies in the enemy’s camp to gather intelligence and information, and often times spread disinformation.
The one maneuver that India can easily employ, is time. He can afford another two decades or more of continuous cease-fire. But can the Nagas afford it? Therefore, instead of just calculating to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the adversary for possible gains or wins, is the GOI really seeking peace with the Nagas through the peace process? Will a solution really materialize within the term of this UPA-II as the Prime Minister had stated or even within this year as the Interlocutor has said? Are the Nagas also really seeking peace among themselves through reconciliation as solemnly stated in the Covenant of Reconciliation? Only a Treaty on the table may convince the people.
