Ngaranmi Shimray
New Delhi
To understand the current conflict, one must go back into history and examine the geopolitical changes that have taken place among the three major societies of Manipur, as well as the role of the Government of India.
The Kukis
The British Raj used the Kukis against the indigenous tribes by issuing them arms. This gave them a military advantage as they moved across the hills and expanded their presence. During the Kuki uprising linked to World War I labour recruitment, they used these weapons not only against the British but also against indigenous communities, striking terror through ruthless attacks on villages. Many indigenous people grew up hearing stories from their parents warning them to remain vigilant because “the Kukis are coming.”
Under both the British administration and independent India, Kuki villages were established with the consent of Naga village authorities, often with the payment of customary taxes. Over time, their population increased through natural growth and, significantly, through illegal migration. This, in turn, fuelled aspirations for a Kuki homeland within Manipur.
Churachandpur, however, cannot be regarded as an exclusively Kuki homeland, as it is inhabited by several tribes that do not identify themselves as Kukis. Meanwhile, certain academicians advanced narratives that, according to critics, distorted historical records by portraying indigenous lands as territories once ruled by Kuki chiefs. Mountains and hills extending up to Assam were assigned Kuki names in support of these narratives. The transformation of political aspirations from tenants to claimants of ownership over indigenous lands lies, in this view, at the heart of the present conflict.
Since around 2000, the Kukis have pursued a multi-pronged strategy. While sections of academia promoted their historical narrative, poppy cultivation allegedly generated resources that enabled the purchase of arms. Politically, the creation of Kangpokpi district provided an important territorial foothold.
From 2008 onwards, the number of Kuki armed cadres and their weapons reportedly increased under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement. With government funding, rations, shelter, and security, they acquired significant advantages. These advantages became evident during the Meitei-Kuki ethnic conflict, when SoO cadres allegedly violated the ground rules without facing meaningful action from the authorities. Even the Joint Monitoring Group appeared largely ineffective then and even today.
The reluctance of the Ministry of Home Affairs to act against SoO cadres during both the Meitei-Kuki conflict and the ongoing Naga-Kuki tensions raises important questions. There may be factors beyond the SoO agreement that deserve closer scrutiny.
Under the present arrangement, it is argued that the Kukis are seeking to consolidate territory around Kangpokpi district. If indigenous populations are displaced from adjoining areas of Ukhrul, Kamjong, Senapati, and Noney districts, Kangpokpi could potentially expand both geographically and demographically. Migration of Kuki populations from some villages into Kangpokpi is taking place and has contributed to this consolidation.
If this trend continues, some fear that indigenous communities, and even Nepali settlers within Kangpokpi district, could eventually face similar pressures. Indigenous communities must therefore understand these evolving strategies and consider proactive measures rather than remaining purely defensive.
The first major Naga-Kuki conflict in the 1990’s was arguably driven by geopolitical considerations. It marked the first significant territorial setback for the Nagas in Moreh, where control shifted to the Kukis. Without a coherent long-term strategy, further territorial losses may occur, while New Delhi could continue policies perceived by critics as indirect support for one side. The recent deployment of additional Cobra battalions has also raised concerns among some observers regarding their future role in the conflict.
The Nagas
The Nagas have long pursued their political movement for self-determination. Over the decades, they believe this struggle has gained recognition both within India and internationally. Consequently, they have generally been reluctant to enter into direct confrontation with Kuki militant groups.
At the same time, the Hebron leadership possesses certain strategic advantages, including the presence of cadres, relatively independent from their direct control, across the international border and in Manipur. These realities may provide strategic options that could prove significant if circumstances continue to deteriorate.
The Meiteis
The Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status remains uncertain and, even if realised, is unlikely to affect Naga lands in the manner often alleged. However, the Kukis present a different challenge for the Meiteis, particularly because the Dimapur-Imphal highway, the valley’s principal lifeline, passes through Kangpokpi district and is frequently disrupted.
Against this backdrop, some argue that restructuring Kangpokpi district should be considered. Portions of the district could be integrated into the adjoining hill districts based on the presence of indigenous populations to districts proximate to their habitation. Such a proposal could become the basis for greater political cooperation between the Nagas and the Meiteis.
A reversal of the decision taken by the Ibobi Singh government to create additional hill districts, by restoring Kangpokpi to its earlier status as Sadar Hills within Senapati district, could then be followed by a redistribution of its different tracts among Senapati, Ukhrul, and Tamenglong districts.
The numerical strength of the Meiteis in the Manipur Legislative Assembly is a political reality that the Nagas cannot ignore. If both communities find common ground, they may be able to contain what they perceive as Kuki territorial ambitions while also facilitating measures such as the implementation of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) to identify illegal immigrants.
From this perspective, cooperation between the Nagas and the Meiteis, coupled with an administrative reorganisation of Kangpokpi, represents a proactive strategy to address what is seen as one of the central drivers of the present conflict. It could entail disassociation from national political parties who can be blamed for having contributed to the escalation of conflict by creating Kangpokpi district and not reversing the decision as demanded by UNC.
