By Moa Jamir
What emerges from the latest report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India on Nagaland is not merely a catalogue of irregularities, but a pattern of systemic dysfunction. From fictitious works and inflated bills to uncollected revenues and failing public services, the findings point to deep-rooted weaknesses in governance rather than isolated lapses. The report spans the social (including local government), economic, general, and revenue sectors, covering 402 of the 1,204 audited units, and covers mostly the period up to 2022–23.
Its breadth underscores both the scale of scrutiny and the extent of concerns across departments. What emerges consistently is a governance framework where planning is weak, implementation inconsistent, and accountability diffused.
At the centre of this deficit are Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), which remain financially constrained and administratively under- capacitated despite being entrusted with core civic functions.
This is most visible in solid waste management, one of the few fully devolved responsibilities. The audit reveals the absence of basic planning: no reliable data on waste generation, no longterm strategies, and no effective monitoring systems. Segregation practices are poor, infrastructure remains inadequate, and even available systems are undermined by weak implementation.
The result is a system operating without direction, where inefficiency is built into the process rather than incidental to it. Across sectors, however, the concerns run deeper and converge. In public health, critical shortages of infrastructure and workforce persist, with limited specialist services and weak emergency care systems forcing patients to seek treatment elsewhere at higher cost. Diagnostic gaps and underutilised equipment further highlight inefficiencies in planning and deployment. In welfare administration, the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Board failed to effectively register beneficiaries, while cess collection remained weak and funds were diverted in violation of norms.
Financial management across departments reveals further cracks. Instances of fictitious works, inflated bills, and irregular payments point to serious lapses in internal controls. At the same time, revenue that should have accrued to the State remains unrealised, whether through non-recovery of police service charges, failure to enforce tourism agreements, or broader inefficiencies in collection mechanisms. The issue, therefore, is not only of misutilisation but also of missed revenue in a resource-constrained State.
Taken together, these findings reflect a governance ecosystem where systems exist on paper but falter in practice. Institutional processes such as inspection, monitoring, financial control, are either weak or bypassed, and accountability mechanisms remain ineffective. Ideally, CAG reports trigger strong public scrutiny and sustained calls for accountability, particularly from the Opposition.
Even under normal circumstances, Nagaland has seldom witnessed such outcomes. In the present political setting, marked by the absence of a conventional Opposition, the likelihood of sustained scrutiny appears even more limited.
The trajectory instead tends to be muted. The reports are tabled in the Assembly, generate a cycle of media coverage, and are subsequently referred to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Beyond this, the momentum often dissipates. Follow-up action is rarely visible, and the findings and the disconnect between audit and action remains the most persistent anomaly.
For accountability to be meaningful, it must extend beyond documentation to enforcement. The CAG has done its part in documenting the gaps across sectors but for Nagaland to progress, the audit must cease to be a mere formality and instead become the catalyst for a more transparent and accountable governance framework.
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