DIMAPUR, OCTOBER 26 (MExN): Five signatories from Manipur to the May 16, 1951 Naga plebiscite have been cited by a group of Southern Naga organisations and individuals to challenge the narrative that Nagas from the region did not participate in the foundational milestones of the Naga political movement.
This was stated in a stance paper issued by the presidents of the Naga People's Organisation (NPO), the Chandel Naga People's Organisation (CNPO) and the Japhou Tribes Council (JTC), along with former United Naga Council general secretary Ashinpou Gangmei and independent researcher Dr Benjamin Gangmei. It argued that the narrative of non-participation risks deepening divisions among Naga communities and undermining the broader Naga political cause.
The paper identified five known signatories to the 1951 plebiscite from Southern Nagalim. They include late Ng Mono Monsang from Chandel district and Ashihe Khekho Mao from Senapati district, along with three members of the Rongmei tribe: late Ramdikamang Pamei of Dailong, Tamenglong; late Mathiuhuam Riamei of Kakhulong, Imphal; and late Meirizinang Panmei of Ajuram, Tamenglong.
The details were attributed to personal communications with Rev Dr Wati Aier, Ukhrul Times, Lungsu Panmei and Gianingam Gangmei, as well as the Rongmei Encyclopedia. “This cold data formally confutes the hot narrative of non-participation from Manipur,” the paper stated.
It described the recurring narrative of non-participation, ethnic sub-identity and geographical peripherality as divisive, arguing that Naga political history was shaped by collective identity and historical developments rather than participation in specific events alone.
“The movement bears collectivity rather than ethnic sub-identity,” the paper stated, adding that Naga political history was “not defined by participation or non-participation in initial foundational milestones like the episodes of 1929 or 1951.” The paper warned that using non-participation as a criterion for determining Naga political history could exclude ancestral Naga areas from the broader homeland narrative, narrow the territorial framework of Naga self-determination and divide Naga tribes into those who participated and those who did not.
“If stuck to non-participation as criterion for determining Naga political history, it will divide the Naga tribes as participated or non-participated Nagas,” it stated. It further argued that such a framework could weaken efforts to reach a political settlement, observing that the Naga movement had reached a stage where both sides were willing to move away from confrontation while seeking a settlement.
“The Nagas are now in situation which defies indefinite postponement,” the paper stated. As an alternative, the signatories invoked the principle of “descriptive representation,” arguing that acquiescence could amount to indirect representation even where communities had not formally participated in foundational milestones.
The paper cited the Indian nationalist movement in the Northeast as a parallel, stating that people in much of the region, apart from Assam, had not formally participated in the movement, but later complied with the political outcome of Indian independence.
It identified three broad phases in Naga political history: an initial period of unity from 1918 to 1951; a period of conflict, fragmentation and compromise from the 1950s to 1997; and a subsequent phase marked by cross-border emotional unity, alongside factional proliferation and parallelism.
The paper also examined competing interpretations of major political milestones, including the 16-point agreement, the creation of Nagaland state, the Agreed Position and the Framework Agreement.
It noted that the 16-point agreement described statehood as “essentially an interim measure” that “in no way closes the door for further political negotiation” and referred to the “consolidation of contiguous Naga areas.”
However, it said Naga “hardliners” viewed the description of statehood as interim in nature as a “delusion,” considering it a surrender of historical rights. The paper argued that the continued engagement of the Government of India with Naga groups outside the state government framework reinforced the argument that statehood had not brought finality to the political issue.
On the Agreed Position and the Framework Agreement, the paper contrasted the NSCN (IM)'s emphasis on historical identity, decades of conflict and collective trauma with the NNPGs' focus on governance, economic concerns and pragmatic prospects. It said these competing approaches had left the Naga public divided between emotional attachment to historical claims and the prospect of a pragmatic political settlement.
Describing Naga society as one of “paradoxes,” the paper pointed to the coexistence of professed unity and tribalism, as well as the contrast between the slogan “Nagaland for Christ” and “factional violence.” It called for a political approach that prioritises unity, integration and cohesion, urging Naga leaders to place collective interests above individual or factional positions. “The hallmark of the discursive dominance is putting the people above selves,” it stated.
The paper urged the Naga public to critically examine narratives influencing the ongoing peace process through what it called a “superordinate lens,” with the broader Naga political goal taking precedence over divisions.
