Naga historiography reveals that it is not merely a collection of internal, inter-tribal dynamics but is instead forged through external encounters. Its reflection point began when colonial rule started, climaxed in post-independence era. With a specific political perspective, the Naga leaders often come up with discursive dominance and drive the news cycle. It is used to inject into the discourse. The pillars of this hot narrative are often ethnic sub-identity, peripherality, and non-participation. The leaders often define the history of Naga political movement by using those structural motifs. Ethnic sub-identity as such motif is an incoherence in the Naga political movement. Because the movement bears collectivity rather than ethnic sub-identity. And, the movement anchored in collectivity, not in centrality alone can’t peter out the peripherality. Finally, the history of Naga political movement is not defined by participation or non-participation in initial foundational milestones like the episodes of 1929 or 1951.
In this regard, the Nagas need to reheat their history by using cold data with a sole purpose to find some necessary factual rebuttals and to duly perceive its most likely adverse consequences. With regard to the polarizing charge of non-participation in the famous Naga plebiscite, 1951 from Manipur Nagas, it is historically refutable or assailable. The cold data for this charge is that plebiscitarian signatories of May 16, 1951 from the Southern Nagalim were five of them known so far. Late Ng Mono Monsang from Chandel district, Manipur (Dr Rev Wati Aier, Personal Communication, May 16, 2024), Ashihe Khekho Mao, Senapati district, Manipur (Ukhrul Times, September 27, 2026). There were three more plebiscitarian signatories from Rongmei tribe of Manipur. Late Ramdikamang Pamei of Dailong, Tamenglong, late Mathiuhuam Riamei of Kakhulong, Imphal and late Meirizinang Panmei of Ajuram, Tamenglong. (Lungsu Panmei and Gainingam Gangmei, Personal Communications, October 13, 2026. Supplemented the source in Rongmei Encyclopedia). This cold data formally confutes the hot narrative of non-participation from Manipur.
The most likely consequences of this hot narrative are presumably fourfold. First, it divides Nagas’ ancestral areas by non-participation. It poses self-executing exclusion of the areas from existing Naga homeland map. Think of the areas in Myanmar, some part of Arunachal Pradesh, Tuensang Frontier Division and N.C. hills. The hot narrative suggests that the mainland Naga areas like Kohima and Makhuchung only remain as primary Naga areas from the beginning. It is premised that not all Nagas from all areas of present Nagaland state did not participate in those initial foundational milestones eventualized before 1952.
Second, the hot narrative resets a framework to rewrite the history of Naga self-determination with a shrunk territorial area by non-participation matrix. Because the hot narrative appears to be an ignoring mechanism for separating history of mainland from that of the peripheral with exclusion of some groups in view.
Third, if stuck to non-participation as criterion for determining Naga political history, it will divide the Naga tribes as participated or non-participated Nagas whose ultimate outcome will be cripplingly disunited the Naga tribes.
Four, the hot narrative practically negates a universal process in ethno-nationalist movement. Of the four stages of usual ethno-nationalist movement, Naga movement is in the last stage in which both sides are willing to abandon confrontation but are keen to find a settlement. Moreover, the Nagas are now in situation which defies indefinite postponement. The hot narrative is observed to be a retrogressive process designing to incapacitate those achievabilities.
Then, how do we neutralize this deplorable determinant of non-participation? The universal principle is that the acquiescence is amounted to indirect representation. This is formalized under the principle of descriptive representation. Because the Nagas, wherever they are, feel the deciding body is descriptive representative of the broader community. The body of signatories of 1929 and plebiscitary voters of 1951 itself serves as a psychological and cultural justification for public compliance. In this regard the case of North-Eastern region in Indian nationalist movement may be cited.
Excepting Assam in the region, people of the region did not formally participate in the movement. But the Indian independence, achieved under the Indian National Congress, serves as the like justification for public compliance for many pro-Indian states. In Naga context also public compliance vibrantly works aligning with the foundational milestones of 1929, 1947, and 1951.
Contrary to these deplorable criteria such as participation, ethnic sub-identity and peripherality, host of historical milestones define history of Naga political movement. The milestones inspire public compliance while facing division and disunity. Because history of Naga political movement is written on the wheel of unity and division over time. The bottom line is that a historical milestone divides or unites the Nagas. The Naga history may be classified into three historical spins. The initial spin (1918–1951) witnesses is primely oneness; (1950s–1997) demonstrates conflict, fracture, and compromise, and finally, the radical spin (1997) exhibits era of public, across-border emotional unity that preceded the chaos multiplication, and parallelism.
In the event of any Naga historical milestone, there are some noticeable outcomes associated with it. First, context-dependent omission; second, ideological polarization, and finally, discursive dominance. Under this analytical framework, history of Naga political movement is sketched. First, the three initial foundational milestones from 1929 to 1951, committed context-dependent omission.
Therefore, the Nagas from different areas did not participate in them. Here, while their acquiescence is amounted to their indirect representation, formalized under the principle of descriptive representation, the omission is often used in ideological polarization fomenting it in conflict situation. Then, the four major milestones from 1963–2015, committed omission of non-signatory faction.
This omission is different from the previous one as it gives no mechanics for indirect or descriptive representation. Because it is not the question of context-dependent omission. It has to operate through two channels: approval or acquiescence driven by prospectivism. This incoherence is the ground of ideological polarization in Naga society started even from 9-point agreement. Because the diametrical forces of the moderates and the hardliners began taking birth in the society. Both sides are in war of ideas or discursive dominance for a paradigm shift.
In case of the creation of Nagaland state or 16-point agreement, the discursive dominance is anchored in the subtexts, referring to the statehood, claim to be “essentially an interim measure”, positing it to be “in no way closes the door for further political negotiation”, and standing for “consolidation of contiguous Naga areas”. On the other hand, the Naga hardliners treat the creation of the state calling it to be “interim nature” is a “delusion”. Because it is surrender of the historical rights of the Nagas. Here, room for “further political negotiation” aligns with the posture of the hardliners. Because Naga self-determination led by hardliners inspanned into conflict even after 1963. And, it is substantiated by the Government of India’s talk with the hardliners, not with any existing state government even today reinforcing the stand that the solution to the Naga political problem through the creation of the state is a non-finality.
Then, with regard to the Agreed Position and the framework Agreement, the discursive dominances of respective adherents and concurring parties, demonstrate their respective ideological entrenchment with which either party tries to bet on the public. The NSCN (IM)’s bet appeals to the heart by relying almost entirely on the visceral, emotional weight of decades of conflict, historical identity, and collective trauma. On the other hand, NNPGs’ bet appeals to the head by sidestepping historical abstractions to make a highly rational, analytical case built on governance, economics, and some pragmatic prospects. These two lines of discursive dominances reign high in present decades without a comparable predictability.
This has caused public dilemma which is why the Naga public remains so painfully torn. As appealed to head the public recognizes NNPGs’ pragmatic approach that offers an immediate exit from economic stagnation and lawlessness. The NSCN (IM) appeals to heart that fears that if its maximalist stance is completely abandoned, the historic sacrifices of the Naga nationalist movement will be lost and its holy grail be turned into a desideratum. This reflects Naga society or its contemporary political landscape. Naga society is often described as a society of paradoxes. The Nagas profess unity yet tribalism reigns high, ‘Nagaland for Christ’ is eclipsed by fratricidal violence, its profess egalitarianism is clouded by sexism. And, the society is beset with the problems of centripetal and centrifugal.
The integrative subtexts such as shared culture, common history of resistance, the plebiscite that inspires public compliance, and emotional dream of common future are masked by divisive subtexts like rigid intra-tribal boundaries, distinct dialects, regional politics and competing factional leadership. The society also suffers from factional polarization, ethno-national ambivalence demonstrating sense of oneness with parallel anxiety that push them back without ability to achieve one administrative and political structure. This conundrum is behind fractured solidarity which is, while working for an overarching Naga cause that remains unbroken, without practical solidarity for one solution.
Therefore, what is a strategic imperative is one that breeds unity, integration, cohesion and forward-lookingness. If the Naga join forces with ethno-nationalists, Naga statesmen or stateswomen, luminaries whose discursive dominance promotes superordinate ethno-political goal, many persistent ills will disappear. The hallmark of the discursive dominance is putting the people above selves which will remain as a trailblazing legacy for the Naga people today and tomorrow. Therefore, it will be the continuing imperative duty for the partitioned Naga people to ever judiciously dissect any hot narrative or discursive dominance used to influence the ongoing terms of the Naga peace process by looking through a superordinate lens.
This stance paper is released on and in behalf of Southern Naga People
• Kuba Peter, President, Naga People's Organization (NPO)
• Db Thamdok Francis, President, Chandel Naga People's Organisation (CNPO)
• Merachao Inka Convenor, Joint Tribes' Council (JTC)
• Ashinpou Gangmei, Former General Secretary, United Naga Council (UNC),
• Dr Benjamin Gangmei, Independent researcher
